Jeff Rubard
2010-02-08 00:25:17 UTC
Karl Leonhard Reinhold
First published Wed Apr 30, 2003; substantive revision Mon Oct 6, 2008
Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757–1823), Austrian philosopher and first
occupant of the chair on Critical Philosophy established at the
University of Jena in 1787, first achieved fame as a proponent of
popular Enlightenment and as an early and effective popularizer of the
Kantian philosophy. During his period at the University of Jena (1787–
94), Reinhold proclaimed the need for a more “scientific” and
systematic presentation of the Critical philosophy, one based upon a
single, self-evident first principle. In an effort to satisfy this
need, he expounded his own “Elementary Philosophy” in a series of
influential works between 1789 and 1791. Though Reinhold's Elementary
Philosophy was much criticized, his call for a more coherent and
systematic exposition of transcendental idealism exercised a profound
influence upon the subsequent development of post-Kantian idealism and
spurred others (such as J. G. Fichte) to seek a philosophical first
principle even more “fundamental” than Reinhold's own “Principle of
Consciousness.” After moving to the University of Kiel, Reinhold
became an adherent, first of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre and then of
C. G. Bardili's “rational realism,” before finally proposing a novel
“linguistic” approach to philosophical problems.
* 1. Reinhold's Life and Work
* 2. The "Elementary Philosophy"
* 3. Reception of Reinhold's Philosophy
* Bibliography
o Reinhold's Works in German and English in Chronological
Order
o Selected Secondary Literature about Reinhold
* Other Internet Resources
* Related Entries
1. Reinhold's Life and Work
Karl Leonhard Reinhold was born in Vienna October 26, 1757 (though
many older sources erroneously give 1758 as his year of his birth). He
studied at the Jesuit Seminary in Vienna for a year, until the order
was suppressed in 1773, at which time he entered the Barnabite
seminary. Following his ordination, he became a Barnabite monk and
served for several years as a parish priest and teacher of philosophy.
Reinhold's first publications were book reviews and short essays in
popular newspapers, in which he showed himself to be a zealous
advocate of Josephite reforms and an enthusiastic exponent of radical
Enlightenment and religious toleration.
In 1783 Reinhold moved to Leipzig and converted to Protestantism. He
also became a Freemason and a member of the Illuminati, and he
remained an active Freemason until the end of his life. Possessed of a
restless, inquiring spirit, Reinhold's early intellectual trajectory
led him from orthodox Catholicism, to reformed Catholicism, to
materialism and atheism, and then to Leibnizianism and to Humean
skepticism. Yet he always remained true to the ideal of
“Enlightenment,” at least as he understood that ideal, and he never
ceased to insist that philosophy ought to make a practical difference
in the world. For all of his forays into the most technical and arcane
philosophical debates and issues, he never wavered in his insistence
that true “popularity” must remain the goal of philosophy, and that
the ultimate test of any system is its capacity for convincing
everyone of its truth. Enlightenment, for Reinhold, was no abstract
pursuit of truth, but a program of religious, moral, social, and
political reform. Coupled with this commitment to popularity, was a
pedagogic zeal to do everything in his power to spread the message of
popular Enlightenment — whether in its materialist, its neo-
Leibnizian, its skeptical, its Kantian, its Fichtean, its Bardilian,
or its distinctively “Reinholdian” form — as widely and as effectively
as possible.
In 1784, after studying philosophy for a semester in Leipzig, Reinhold
moved to Weimar, where he became a confidant (and son-in-law) of C. M.
Wieland and a regular contributor to Wieland's widely read Der
Teutsche Merkur. It was in this journal that his famous series of
“Letters on the Kantian Philosophy” began to appear in 1786. It is
with these “Letters,” which were subsequently published in revised and
expanded form in two volumes, that Reinhold's name enters the history
of philosophy. What Reinhold found in Kant is clearly expressed in the
first of his many private letters to the latter: namely, a way to
resolve the debilitating conflict between faith and reason,
“superstition” and “disbelief,” “heart” and “head.” And this is
precisely the aspect of the new, Critical philosophy that is
emphasized in his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy: not Kant's
radical new account of space and time, nor his audacious effort to
provide a transcendental deduction of the pure categories of the
understanding, but rather the conclusions and implications of the
“transcendental dialectic.”
Kantianism was recommended by Reinhold, above all, for its allegedly
salubrious and enlightened practical consequences, particular with
respect to religion and morality. It was not for nothing that Reinhold
described this new philosophy to readers of Die Teutscher Merkur as
“the gospel of pure reason.” Rational belief in God, in the
immortality of the soul, in the reality of free will: such are the
articles of this new “gospel” — a gospel promulgated, everyone agreed,
far more effectively and popularly by Reinhold than by Kant himself.
Even Kant professed to be charmed by Reinhold's effort and gratified
by his success.
On the strength of his newfound fame as author of the Letters,
Reinhold was invited to be the inaugural occupant of the first
professorial chair devoted exclusively to the new Kantian philosophy,
and thus he began lecturing at the University of Jena in 1787. First
at Jena, and then later at the University of Kiel, Reinhold proved to
be an immensely popular and influential teacher, much beloved by his
students. (Of the approximately 860 students enrolled in Jena in the
Spring Semester of 1794, 600 were enrolled in Reinhold's three lecture
courses.) Indeed, Reinhold was largely responsible for making Jena the
center of German philosophy, which it remained for the next several
decades.
In his published Letters on the Kantian Philosophy Reinhold had
excused himself from the task of presenting and examining the
theoretical foundations of Kant's Critical philosophy, in order to
concentrate instead upon the practical consequences of the same. But
once he arrived at Jena he set himself to the former task, the
surprising result of which was not so much the popularization of
another aspect of Kant's thought as a first, historically momentous
effort to revise and recast the theoretical foundations of the new
transcendental idealism in a new, allegedly more coherent and
systematic form. The fruit of this revisionist effort was Reinhold's
own “Elementary Philosophy” (see below), which, though only a passing
phase in Reinhold's own development as a philosopher, remains his most
substantial and effective contribution to the historical development
of German Idealism.
Reinhold's Elementary Philosophy is most fully expounded in three
works he published in rapid succession during his tenure at the
University of Jena: Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen
Vorstellungsvermögens [Attempt a New Theory of the Human Power of
Representation] (1789), Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger
Missverständnisse der Philosophen, Erster Band [Contributions toward
Correcting the Previous Misunderstandings of Philosophers, Vol. I]
(1790), and Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens [On the
Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge] (1791).
Reinhold's radical revision and implicit critique of orthodox
Kantianism exercised an immediate and immense influence upon his
contemporaries, and particularly upon the philosopher who followed him
at Jena in 1794, namely Johann Gottlieb Fichte. But though Fichte was
thoroughly convinced by Reinhold's arguments for the incompleteness of
Kant's own presentation of the Critical philosophy and by his demand
for an immediately certain “first principle” of the same, he was not
satisfied with Reinhold's own efforts to satisfy these demands and, in
the Aenesidemus review and elsewhere, made public his own criticisms
of the Elementary Philosophy and of Reinhold's “Principle of
Consciousness.” For a few years following Fichte's arrival in Jena and
Reinhold's transfer to Kiel, the two men engaged in a wide-ranging and
stimulating philosophical correspondence, though they never met.
The final upshot of Reinhold's Auseinandersetzung with Fichte was the
former's recantation of his own Elementary Philosophy and transference
of his allegiance to the standpoint of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre.
This conversion was made public in early 1798, in a lengthy review
essay in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung of Fichte's recent writings,
and it was elaborated the following year in Reinhold's Ueber die
Paradoxien der neuesten Philosophie [Concerning the Paradoxes of the
most recent Philosophy], in which he explicitly acknowledged the
inadequacy of his own Principle of Consciousness as the foundation of
philosophy as a whole and endorsed Fichte's proposal for a more
“active” first principle (the Tathandlung, or “fact-act” of the I's
self-positing), which would be capable of fully integrating
theoretical with practical reason, as well as uniting theoretical and
practical philosophy.
As his contribution to the Atheism Controversy of 1798/99, which led
to Fichte's departure from Jena, Reinhold published a pamphlet in
Fichte's defense. However, it was not long before he grew dissatisfied
with what he perceived to be the “one-sidedness” of Fichte's
philosophy — and indeed, of transcendental idealism as a whole — and
publicly sought some “third way,” which could reconcile the opposing
positions of Fichte and Jacobi (whose contribution to the Atheism
Controversy was an influential “Open letter,” criticizing philosophy
in general and Fichte's transcendental idealism in particular as
“nihilism.”) This effort on Reinhold's part to mediate the differences
between the transcendental idealist “philosopher of freedom” (Fichte)
and the common-sense “non-philosopher of faith” (Jacobi) pleased
neither party, and signaled the quick and abrupt end of Reinhold's
short-lived “Fichte phase.”
After resolutely turning his back on the new post-Kantian idealist
philosophy that he himself had done so much to instigate, Reinhold now
presented himself to the public, in the six issues of his own Beyträge
zur leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beym Anfange
des 19. Jahrhunderts [Contributions to an Easier Overview of the State
of Philosophy at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century] (1801–1803),
as a partisan of the “logical realism” of C. G. Bardili, which was an
effort to base philosophy upon pure logic and upon an appeal to what
Bardili called “thinking qua thinking.” It was this effort on
Reinhold's part, in the first issue of the Beyträge, “to reduce
philosophy to logic” that drew the sarcastic ire of Hegel in his
notorious appendix to his Differenz des Fichte'schen und
Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie [Difference between the
Fichtean and Schellingian System of Philosophy] (1801)
Soon enough, however, Reinhold became dissatisfied with Bardili's
position as well, and began publicly to criticize the same “from the
standpoint of language” and to reject all efforts to ground philosophy
in pure formal logic. Reinhold's final project as a philosopher can be
described as a pioneering effort to take seriously the implications of
ordinary language for philosophy itself and to insist upon the
intimate relationship between speaking and thinking. These writings of
Reinhold's final years went nearly unnoticed during his own lifetime
and have generally remained unknown until the present day; yet they
would appear to merit the attention of contemporary philosophers and
scholars, inasmuch as they anticipate in certain ways the “linguistic
turn” of so much subsequent philosophy
After a lifetime of philosophical inquiry, during which he influenced
countless readers and students, while himself moving restlessly from
one theoretical standpoint to another, Reinhold died in Kiel in 1823.
2. The "Elementary Philosophy"
No sooner did he begin lecturing on the first Critique than Reinhold
began to have serious doubts about the completeness of Kant's
philosophy, the soundness of its theoretical foundations, and the
adequacy of Kant's own arguments and deductions. With remarkable
alacrity and considerable ingenuity, he took it upon himself to remedy
these perceived defects in Kant's own presentation and to construct
his own, allegedly more systematic, well-grounded, and “universally
acceptable” version of the new Critical philosophy.
Though Reinhold sometimes referred to his new system simply as
“philosophy without a nickname,” it soon became known by another name
that he used for it, namely: “Elementary Philosophy” or “Philosophy of
the Elements” [Elementarphilosophie]. After introducing his new
philosophical ideas in his own lectures, Reinhold began laying them
before the public in a series of essays in popular and professional
journals, essays which were then revised and expanded as chapters of
the three books which together constitute his “official” exposition of
the Elementary Philosophy: Versuch einer neuen Theorie des
menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens (1789), Beyträge zur Berichtigung
bisheriger Missverständnisse der Philosophen, Erster Band (1790), and
Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (1791).
Reinhold introduced his presentation of the Elementary Philosophy with
the following “metaphilosophical” questions: How is philosophy
possible as a strict science, and what is the distinguishing feature
of such a science? Following Kant, as well as the entire rationalist
tradition, Reinhold maintained that the essence of science lies in
universality and necessity. But these are properties of thought, not
of sensation or intuition. Only through thinking and judging can we
recognize universality and necessity, a recognition that is, in turn,
formulated and expressed in concepts and propositions. The business of
philosophy is therefore to establish “universally
valid” [allgemeingültig] propositions in a manner that allows their
necessity and universality to be universally recognized as binding
upon everyone [allgemeingeltend]. This last requirement reveals the
intimate link between Reinhold's earlier efforts at “popularizing” the
Kantian philosophy and his subsequent efforts to expand and to ground
this same system. One of the constant hallmarks of Reinhold's
philosophical efforts was his conviction that a genuinely scientific
philosophy must be capable of being understood and recognized as true
by everyone.
What makes philosophy “scientific,” according to Reinhold, is not
simply that it consists of propositions arrived at by thinking, but
rather, the logical connection between the propositions in question —
that is, their systematic form. Over and over again, in one forum
after another, Reinhold trumpeted the same declaration: scientific
philosophy is systematic philosophy. Accordingly, he embarked upon an
influential analysis of systematic form as such, in order to gain
insight into how Kantianism could be made rigorously systematic and
therefore genuinely “scientific.”
The fundamental hallmarks of systematic form, according to Reinhold,
are consistency and completeness, but it was the former of these that
attracted most of Reinhold's attention. The only way to be sure that
any two propositions are truly consistent with one another — and
hence, the only way to determine whether a number of philosophical
propositions actually constitute a “system” — is to show that they can
all be traced back to the same first principle or foundation
[Grundsatz]. And the only way to show that they can indeed be “traced
back” to such a first principle is by actually “deriving” them
therefrom. (Despite his efforts to clarify this point, Reinhold's
conception of philosophical “derivation” — which is apparently not to
be understood as simple logical deduction — nevertheless remains
extraordinarily murky.)
It follows that a philosophical system must begin with a single first
principle, which “determines” all the other propositions of the
system. (Here again, there is a certain obscurity in Reinhold's claim,
inasmuch as he insisted that the first principle “determines” only the
“form” and not the “content” of all the other, subordinate
propositions, yet he also described the relationship between the first
principle and the subordinate principles as a “syllogism,” in which
the latter are “derived” from the former.) Only if propositions are
logically related to one another in this manner can they constitute a
“system.” A system with two or more “first principles” is not a system
at all, but several different systems. As for the completeness
problem, Reinhold's implicit solution seems to have been to seek an a
priori first principle that could be known in advance to encompass the
entire domain of experience, and hence of philosophy.
What, however, can one say about the truth (or, as Reinhold was more
likely to say, the “validity” [Gültigkeit]) of the proposed first
principle itself? If the validity of a philosophical proposition is
determined by its systematic, logical connection to other
propositions, then what determines the truth of the first principle,
from which the system as a whole is generated or derived? The answer,
Reinhold thought, is obvious: the first principle and systematic
starting point of philosophy must be self-evident. It must be
immediately certain.
Despite reservations concerning the capacity of the first principle to
determine the content, as opposed to the form, of the propositions
derived from it, Reinhold unequivocally maintained that the first
principle of all philosophy had to be a material (or synthetic) as
well as a formal (or analytic) principle. Otherwise, “scientific
philosophy” would be identical to formal logic and would have no
content of its own, which Reinhold (at this point anyway) staunchly
denied. Moreover, according to Reinhold, the establishment of such a
universally valid and immediately certain first principle is not
merely a pressing requirement of theoretical reason, but also a matter
of the utmost practical urgency, inasmuch as in the absence of such a
foundational first principle “philosophy itself is impossible as a
science, in which case the basis for our ethical duties and rights —
as well as those duties and rights themselves — must remain forever
undecided” (Beyträge I, p. 367).
Granted, then, that a system of philosophy must begin with a single,
immediately certain, synthetic first proposition or “grounding
principle”: where might one turn in order to discover and to recognize
the first principle in question, a proposition that alone can serve as
the foundation or “ground” of all other philosophical propositions and
cannot itself be established by any argument? The answer is, we must
turn within — to the consideration of consciousness itself. This,
Reinhold maintained, is precisely what Kant (not to mention Descartes)
had done, albeit he did not succeed in presenting the fruits of his
inquiries in an adequately scientific and systematic form.
What then is the “first principle” of the Elementary Philosophy? It is
the “Principle of Consciousness,” namely, the proposition that “in
consciousness, the subject distinguishes the representation from the
subject and the object and relates the representation to
both” (Beyträge I, p. 167). In this proposition, the term
“representation” [Vorstellung] designates whatever we are directly
conscious of whenever we are conscious of anything whatsoever; the
term “subject” designates the one who “is conscious” of whatever one
is conscious of (the “conscious subject” or “subject of
consciousness”); and the term “object” designates that “of which” the
representation is a representation (the intentional object of
consciousness, that to which the representation “refers”).
Though “self-evident” and “universally valid,” the proposition
asserting this tripartite character of consciousness is, according to
Reinhold, not analytic but synthetic. The Principle of Consciousness
is not a tautology, yet anyone who reflects upon what is asserted by
this principle will immediately recognize its truth and universal
validity, inasmuch as it expresses what Reinhold called a “universally
recognized fact of consciousness.”
Self-evidence alone, however, is not enough. One of the chief merits
of the Principle of Consciousness, according to Reinhold, is that from
it one can then derive the starting point of Kant's own philosophy,
which appears to begin with a sheer, ungrounded assumption of the
distinction between intuiting and thinking, the difference between
theoretical and practical reason, etc. From this point, Reinhold
assures us, one can then proceed to the derivation of a complete
system of philosophy as a whole, as envisioned but never actually
accomplished by Kant himself. (One must recall that Reinhold's work on
Elementary Philosophy preceded Kant's third Critique.)
With the Principle of Consciousness Reinhold believed he had uncovered
that “common root” of thought and sensibility, which Kant had declared
to be unknowable. By commencing his analysis at the level of
“representations as such,” Reinhold was convinced that he had, so to
speak, hit philosophical rock bottom, inasmuch as all consciousness is
self-evidently “representational” in character. (Fichte, however, in
his Aenesidemus review and his early writings on the
Wissenschaftslehre, would subsequently challenge precisely this
claim.) Thus, Reinhold's “Theory of Representation” (which is the
first section of the Elementary Philosophy) purports to provide Kant's
Critical philosophy with the very foundation it so sorely lacks. And
the Principle of Consciousness is, in turn, the foundational or first
principle of this new Theory of Representation — and hence the first
principle of philosophy as a whole.
By far the most original and influential portion of the Elementary
Philosophy is its first part, the Theory of Representation, which is
devoted entirely to an analysis of our fundamental spiritual power —
the power of representation itself [Vorstellungsvermögen] — in an
effort to determine “everything that can be known a priori concerning
the representations of sensibility, understanding, and reason.” This
foundational portion of the Elementary Philosophy thus purports to
provide a thorough and complete analysis of the necessary features of
representation qua representation, an analysis that claims to show
“that space, time, the twelve categories, and the three forms of the
ideas are originally nothing but properties of mere
representations” (Fundament, pp. 72–73). This same analysis of our
power of representation also claims to establish the distinction
between the form and content of representations, the necessity of both
receptivity and spontaneity on the part of the power of
representation, the necessary multiplicity of sensations, and the
unknowability of things in themselves.
If Reinhold displays considerable originality and ingenuity in
deriving the above mentioned results from his first principle (the
Principle of Consciousness), the same cannot be said of the subsequent
section of the Elementary Philosophy, the “Theory of the Power of
Cognition,” which follows Kant's own exposition much more closely than
the Theory of the Power of Representation and becomes increasingly
schematic — and less convincing — as it advances. (Reinhold's sole
attempt at complete exposition of his “Theory of the Power of
Cognition” is roughly sketched in Book 3 of the Versuch, whereas the
“Theory of the Power of Representation” is treated in elaborate detail
in all three of his book-length presentations of the Elementary
Philosophy.)
One may recall that Reinhold's intention was to provide a new
foundation not merely for the “theoretical philosophy” expounded by
Kant in the first Critique, but for the Critical philosophy as a
whole, including Kant's practical philosophy. In fact, however,
Reinhold provided his readers with only the barest hints of how his
Elementary Philosophy might embrace Kant's account of will and of
practical reason. Significantly, this occurs in the final, 19 page
section of his “Theory of the Power of Cognition,” entitled “Theory of
the Power of Desire,” in which Reinhold limits himself to what he
himself describes as the mere “outline” of a strategy for
demonstrating the unity of theoretical and practical reason: if
willing is the condition for the possibility of actual, as opposed to
merely possible representation and cognition, then the “power of
desire” conditions the powers of cognition and representation.
Unfortunately, Reinhold never fleshed out this fascinating outline,
never provided any arguments for the same, and never indicated how
this provocative claim concerning the relation of willing to knowing
could be reconciled with the “immediate certainties” of his starting
point. And this was precisely what provoked his most brilliant and
critical reader, J. G. Fichte to attempt his own version of an
Elementary Philosophy — a version that would begin with the unity of
the theoretical and the practical and that would, with the act of
“positing” or Setzen, claim to have discovered a starting point even
more “basic” than that of mere “representation.” (It is significant
that Fichte's unpublished notebook of 1793/94, in which he first
sketched what would subsequently be known as the Wissenschaftslehre or
“Theory of Scientific Knowledge,” was titled “Private Meditations on
Elementary Philosophy/Practical Philosophy.”)
It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence of Reinhold's
inquiries into systematicity and first principles upon an entire
generation of philosophers. Though some recent research on Reinhold
and the “Jena circle” of the late 1780s has stressed the degree to
which Reinhold himself soon came to have doubts about the project of
“philosophy from a single principle” (see the work of Dieter Henrich
and his students, such as Marcello Stamm), this project was
nevertheless enthusiastically embraced by Fichte and the young
Schelling, and inspired others, notably Hegel, to re-examine (and to
question) the alleged connection between systematic form and self-
evident first principles. Reinhold's subsequent reservations about his
own Elementary Philosophy notwithstanding, the Elementary Philosophy
remains one of the clearest examples of a thoroughgoing
“foundationalist” project in the history of European philosophy.
3. Reception of Reinhold's Philosophy
During Reinhold's own lifetime, or at least during certain phases of
the same, he was among the more influential philosophers in Germany —
first as an immensely successful popularizer of the Kantian revolution
and then, with his effort to construct an Elementary Philosophy, as
one of the founders of “post-Kantian idealism.” This, however, nearly
exhausts his positive influence upon his contemporaries.
Following the heyday of German idealism, Reinhold's name has generally
been relegated to the history of philosophy, within which he is
assigned the role of serving as a small, but not insignificant rung on
the alleged ladder “from Kant to Hegel,” and this is precisely how he
is still treated in most general histories of philosophy (as well as
in this entry). In this context, Reinhold is usually credited with (or
blamed for) putting the issues of systematic form and “philosophical
foundations” at the center of philosophical concern. Even those, such
as Fichte, who roundly criticized the details of his Elementary
Philosophy professed sincere admiration for Reinhold's “systematic
spirit.” And many of those who rejected his contention that the
Principle of Consciousness could serve as the first principle of a
philosophy as a whole, nevertheless praised him as the philosopher who
first recognized the need for some such principle and first sought to
provide Kantianism with a solid “foundation.” In both of these
respects, Reinhold served as an important catalyst or stimulus for
further philosophical developments.
Given this situation, it his hardly surprising that — with a few minor
exceptions — the only works of Reinhold familiar even to most
scholars, as well as the only writings by him to be reissued after his
lifetime, were the Letters on the Kantian Philosophy and the three,
above-mentioned volumes in which he expounded his Elementary
Philosophy. This, however, is unfortunate, inasmuch as these texts
represent only a small fraction of Reinhold's literary output and do
not include some of his most original ideas, projects, and literary
productions, such as his final writings on philosophy and language and
his pioneering, lifelong efforts to get philosophers to take seriously
the history of their own discipline and to understand the “history of
philosophy” philosophically.
This situation has recently begun to change, however. A critical
edition of Reinhold's voluminous and important philosophical
correspondence was inaugurated in 1983 (though only one of the
projected ten volumes has appeared to date), and plans are currently
afoot for an edition — the first ever — of Reinhold's complete works.
Newly edited editions of some of Reinhold's major works have also
begun to appear, most notably the two volumes of his Beyträge zur
Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der Philosophen, edited by
Alessandro Lazzari and issued in the "Philosophische Bibliothek"
series published by Felix Meiner.
For many years, the serious secondary literary on Reinhold was very
sparse and was dominated by Alfred Klimmt's monograph (see below).
Recent years, however, have seen a spate of new articles and
monographs devoted to Reinhold, the most significant of which are the
works by Wolfgang Schrader and the recent, groundbreaking book by
Martin Bondeli. Also worth mentioning is Alexander von Schönborn's
annotated bibliography of Reinhold's writings, a fine example of
scholarly detective work and an essential tool for further research.
In conjunction with and as part of the renaissance of Fichte studies
over the past four decades, there have been numerous efforts to
reexamine the relationship between Reinhold and Fichte, and, in
particular, to reassess the precise debt of the Wissenschaftslehre to
the Elementary Philosophy. Accordingly, the scholarly literature on
Fichte includes numerous studies of this aspect of Reinhold's
achievement.
Even more recently and for the first time ever, Reinhold's ideas have
begun to be expounded, criticized, and debated among Anglophone
scholars and philosophers, including Karl Ameriks, Frederick C.
Beiser, Daniel Breazeale, Paul Franks, and Alexander von Schönborn. A
recent annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American
Philosophical Association featured a session devoted almost entirely
to a debate (between Ameriks and Breazeale) over Reinhold's actual
contribution to post-Kantian philosophy and the merits of his
position. Such a debate would have been unimaginable even a few
decades ago.
Appreciation and discussion of Reinhold among Anglophone readers is,
however, not likely to spread very widely until more of Reinhold's
writings have become available in English. Until very recently the
English reader had to make do with incomplete translations of two
works by Reinhold: one, by George di Giovanni, of excerpts from the
Fundament and another, by Sabine Rohr, of portions of the Verhandlung
über die Grundbegriffe und Grundsätze der Moralität aus dem
Gesichtspunke des gemeinen und gesunden Verstandes. In 2005 a fine
translation of the first series of Reinhold's "Letters on the Kantian
Philosophy," translated by James Hebbeler and edited by Karl Ameriks,
was published as the series of "Cambridge Texts in the History of
Philosophy." However, the rest of Reinhold's philosophical writings
still await English translation.
In 1998 Reinhold's philosophy was the subject of an international
academic conference — the first such conference ever to be devoted to
Reinhold — in Bad Homburg, Germany. The second international Reinhold
conference was held in Luzern, Switzerland in 2002; the third, in
Rome, Italy in 2004; and the fourth in Montreal, Canada in 2007. (The
published Proceedings of the first three of these conferences have
already appeared and those of the fourth are forthcoming.) The level
of scholarship and philosophical acumen on display at these two events
was very high and augurs well for the future. Indeed, one could argue
that the future of Reinhold Studies is brighter today than at any time
since Reinhold's death.
Bibliography
Reinhold's Works in German and English in Chronological Order
(Note that almost all of Reinhold's books consist of revised versions
of material that originally appeared in the form of journal articles.
For a complete listing of all of Reinhold's writings, see the
bibliography by Alexander von Schönborn.)
* Schriften zur Religionskritik und Aufklärung, 1782–1784, ed. Zwi
Batscha (Bremen: Jacobi-Verlag, 1977).
* Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie[Erster Band] (1790). (Both
volumes reprinted in a single volume, ed. Raymund Schmidt [Leipzig:
Reclam, 1921]. English translation of the first eight letters in the
versions originally published in Der Teutsche Merkur, supplemented by
"the major additions in the 1790 edition," in Letters on the Kantian
Philosophy, trans. James Hebbeler, ed. Karl Ameriks. [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005].)
* Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen
Vorstellungsvermögens (1789; 2nd ed. 1795). (Photomechanical reprint
ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963.)
* Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der
Philosophen, Erster Band (1790). (New edition, edited and with an
introduction by Faustino Fabbianell. [Hamburg: Meiner/Philosophische
Bibliothek 554a, 2003]. A photomechancial reprint of Sect. V of this
work, “Ueber die Möglichkeit der Philosophie als strenge
Wissenschaft,” is included in the volume containing the
photomechanical reprint edition ofUeber das Fundament des
philosophischen Wissens, ed. Wolfgang H. Schrader [Hamburg: Meiner,
1978].)
* Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (1791).
(Photomechanical reprint edition, ed. Wolfgang H. Schrader [Hamburg:
Meiner, 1978]. Partial translation, The Foundation of Philosophical
Knowledge, trans. George di Giovonni. In Between Kant and Hegel: Texts
in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, ed. George di Giovanni
and H. S. Harris [Albany: SUNY Press, 1985], pp. 52–106.)
* Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie, Zweyter Band (1792).
(Both volumes of the Briefe were later reprinted in a single volume,
ed. Raymund Schmidt [Leipzig: Reclam, 1921].)
* Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der
Philosophen, Zweyter Band (1794). (New edition, edited and with an
introduction by Faustino Fabbianell. [Hamburg: Meiner/Philosophische
Bibliothek 554b, 2004.])
* Auswahl vermischter Schriften [Erster Theil] (1796).
* Auswahl vermischter Schriften, Zweyter Theil (1797).
* Review of Fichte's, Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre,
Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, Grundrisse des
Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre in Rücksicht auf das
theoretische Vermögen, and Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft
Teutscher Gelehrten, Band 5, Heft 1–6. (1798). (Rpt. in J. G. Fichte
in zeitgenössischen Rezensionen, Band 2, ed. Erich Fuchs, Wilhelm G.
Jacobs, and Walter Schieche, pp. 286–321 [Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt:
Frommann-Holzboog, 1995].)
* Verhandlung über die Grundbegriffe und Grundsätze der Moralität
aus dem Gesichtspunke des gemeinen und gesunden Verstandes (1798).
(Partial translation in Sabine Roehr, A Primer on German
Enlightenment: With a Translation of Karl Leonhard Reinhold's “The
Fundamental Concepts and Principles of Ethics” [Columbia: University
of Missouri Press, 1995], pp. 157–251.)
* Ueber die Paradoxien der neuesten Philosophie (1799).
* Sendschreiben an J. C. Lavater und J. G. Fichte über den Glauben
an Gott (1799).
* Beyträge zur leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie
beym Anfange des 19. Jahrhunderts, Heft 1–3 (1801), Heft 4 (1802),
Heft 5–6 (1803). (This journal was founded and edited by Reinhold, who
also contributed most of the editorial content.)
* C. G. Bardilis und C. L. Reinholds Briefwechsel über das Wesen
der Philosophie und das Unwesen der Speculation (1804).
* Prologomena zur Analysis in der Philosophie (1804).
* Etwas über den Widerspruch (1804).
* C. L. Reinhold's Anleitung zur Kenntniß und Beurtheilung der
Philosophie in ihren sämmtlichen Lehregebäuden (1805; 2nd ed. 1824).
* Versuch einer Auflösung der von der philosophischen Classe der
königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin für 1805 aufgestellten
Aufgabe: “Die Natur der Analysis und der analytischen Methode in der
Philosophie genau anzugeben, und zu untersuchen: ob und was es für
Mittel gebe, ihren Gebrauch sicher, leichter und nützlicher zu
machen” (1805).
* Versuch einer Critik der Logik aus dem Gesichtspunkte der
Sprache (1806).
* Die Anfangsgründe der Erkenntniß der Wahrheit in einer Fibel für
noch unbefriedigte Forscher nach dieser Erkenntiß (1808).
* Rüge einer merkürdigen Sprachverwirrung unter den Weltweisen
(1809).
* Grundlegung einer Synonymik für den allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch
in den philosophischen Wissenschaften (1812).
* Das menschliche Erkenntnißvermögen, aus dem Gesichtspunkte des
durch die Wortsprache vermittelten Zusammenhang zwischen der
Sinnlichkeit und dem Denkvermögen (1816).
* Ueber den Begriff und die Erkenntniß der Wahrheit (1817).
* Die alte Frage: Was ist die Wahrheit? bey den erneuerten
Streitigkeiten über die göttliche Offenbarung und die menschliche
Vernunft, in nähere Erwägung gezogen (1820).
* Karl Leonhard Reinhold Korrespondenzausgabe der österreichischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vol. I, ed. Reinhard Lauth, Eberhard
Heller, and Karl Hiller (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog,
1983). Nine more volumes of this edition are projected.
Selected Secondary Literature About Reinhold
* Adam, Herbert, 1930. Carl Leonhard Reinholds philosophischer
Systemwechsel, Heidelberg: Carl Winter.
* Ahlers, Rolf, 2003. “Fichte, Jacobi und Reinhold über
Speculation und Leben,” Fichte-Studien, 21: 1–25.
* Ameriks, Karl, 2000. Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in
the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy, New York: Cambridge
University Press. (On Reinhold, see Pt. II, pp. 81–159.)
* Beiser, Frederick C., 1987. The Fate of Reason: German
Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
(On Reinhold, see Ch. 8, pp. 226–65.)
* Bondeli, Martin, 1995. Das Anfangsproblem bei Karl Leonhard
Reinhold. Eine systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche
Untersuchung zur Philosophie Reinholds in der Zeit von 1789 bis 1803,
Frankfurt: Klostermann.
* Bondeli, Martin, 2001. “Freiheit im Anschluss an Kant. Zur Kant-
Reinhold-Kontroverse und ihren Folgen.” In Akten des IX
Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, V. Gerhardt, R.-P. Horstmann, and R.
Schumacher (eds.), Berlin: de Gruyter.
* Bondeli, Martin, 1994. “Geschmack und Vergnügen in Reinholds
Aufklärungskonzept und philosophischem Programm während der Phase der
Elementarphilosophie.” In Evolution des Geistes: Jena um 1800, F.
Strack (ed.), Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 328-49.
* Bondeli, Martin, 1995. “Hegel und Reinhold,” Hegel-Studien, 30:
45-87.
* Bondeli, Martin, 1998. “Hegel und Reinholds Rationaler
Rationalismus.” In Hegels Jenaer Naturphilosophie, Munich: Fink
Verlag.
* Bondeli, Martin, 1997. “Hegels Identitätsphilosophie in
Auseinandersetzung mit Reinholds Rationalem Realismus.” In Hegels
Jenaer Naturphilosophie, K. Vieweg (ed.), Paderborn/München: W. Fink,
pp. 163–74.
* Bondeli, Martin and W. H. Schrader (eds.), 2003. Die Philosophie
Karl Leonhard Reinholds. (Beiträge der Internationalen Reinhold-Tagung
von Bad Homburg, März 1998), Amsterdam: Rodopi.
* Bondeli, Martin and Alessandro Lazzari (eds.), 2003. Philosophie
ohne Beinamen. System, Freiheit und Geschichte im Denken C.L.
Reinholds, Basel: Schwabe-Verlag, 2003. (Proceedings of the second
international Reinhold conference, held in Lucerne in 2002.)
* Bondili, Martin, 1997. “Reinhold im Lichte Kants und Hegels. Zu
G.W. Fuchs: C.L. Reinhold – Illuminat und Philosoph; P. Valenza:
Reinhold e Hegel,” Hegel-Studien, 31: 159-66.
* Bondili, Martin, 1998. “Von Herder zu Kant, zwischen Kant und
Herder, mit Herder gegen Kant – Karl Leonhard Reinhold.” In Herder und
die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, M. Heinz (ed.), Amsterdam,
Atlanta: Rodopi, pp. 203–34.
* Bondili, Martin, 1997. “Zu Fichtes Kritik an Reinholds
‘empirischem’ Satz des Bewußtseins,” Fichte-Studien, 9: 199-213.
* Breazeale, Daniel, 1982. “Between Kant and Fichte: Karl Leonhard
Reinhold's ‘Elementary Philosophy,’” Review of Metaphysics, 35: 785–
821.
* Breazeale, Daniel, 1998. “Putting Doubt in its Place: Karl
Leonhard Reinhold on the Relationship between Philosophical Skepticism
and Transcendental Idealism.” In The Skeptical Tradition around 1800,
J. van der Zande and R. H. Popkin (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 119–
32.
* Cloeren, Hermann-Joseph, 1972. “Philosophie als Sprachkritik bei
K. L. Reinhold. Interpretative Bemerkungen zu seiner Spätphilosophie,”
Kant-Studien, 63: 225-36.
* Fabienelli, Faustino (ed.), 2003. Die zeitgenössischen
Rezensionen der Elementarphilosophie K. L. Reinhold, Hildesheim: Olms.
* Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 1794. “Recenzion des
Aenesidemus.” (“Review of Aenesidemus,” trans. Daniel Breazeale. In
Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1988, pp. 59–77.)
* Frank, Manfred, 1997. “Unendliche Annäherung”: Die Anfänge der
philosophischen Frühromantik, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. (On
Reinhold, see Pt. II, pp. 112–662.)
* Franks, Paul, 2000. “All or Nothing: Systematicity and Nihilism
in Jacobi, Reinhold, and Maimon.” In The Cambridge Companion to German
Idealism, Karl Ameriks (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
pp. 95–116.
* Fuchs, Gerhard W., 1994. Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Illuminat und
Philosoph: eine Studie über den Zusammenhang seines Engagements als
Freimaurer und Illuminat mit seinem Leben und philosophischen Wirken,
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
* Hegel, G.W.F., 1801. Differenz des Fichte'schen und
Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie. (The Difference Between
Fichte's und Schelling's System of Philosophy, ed. and H. S. Harris
and Walter Cerf (trans.), Albany: SUNY Press, 1977.)
* Henrich, Dieter, 1991. Konstellationen. Probleme und Debatten am
Ursprung der idealistischen Philosophie, Stuttgart: Cotta.
* Horstmann, Rolf-Peter, 1972. “Maimon's Criticism of Reinhold's
Satz des Bewusstseins.” In Proceedings of the Third International Kant
Congress, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 350–8.
* Kim, Yun Ku, 1996. Religion, Moral und Aufklärung: Reinholds
philosophischer Werdegang, Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
* Klemmt, Alfred, 1958. Karl Leonhard Reinholds
Elementarphilosophie. Eine Studie über den Ursprung des spekulativen
deutschen Idealismus, Hamburg: Meiner.
* Lauth, Reinhold (ed.), 1974. Philosophie aus einem Prinzip. Karl
Leonhard Reinhold, Bonn: Bouvier. (A collection of essays by seven
different scholars.)
* Lazzari, Alessandro, 2004. “Das Eine, was der Menscheit Noth
ist” Einheit und Freiheit in der Philosophie Karl Leonhard Reinholds
(1789–1792), Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Fommann-Holzboog.
* Leopoldsberger, Jürgen, 1968/69. “Anfang und Methode als die
Grundprobleme der systematischen Philosophie. Reinhold, Fichte,
Hegel,” Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie, 12/13: 7–48.
* Lukjanow, Arkadij V., 2003. “Die Beziehung zwischen Geist und
System bei Fichte und Reinhold,” Fichte-Studien, 21: 111–16.
* Perconti, Pietro, 1999. Kantian Linguistics. Theories of Mental
Representation and the Linguistic Transformation of Kantism. Münster:
Nodus. (For Reinhold, see Chs. 2 and 5.)
* Pinkard, Terry, 2002. German Philosophy 1760–1869; The Legacy of
Idealism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (For Reinhold, see
Ch. 4, pp. 96–104.)
* Pupi, Angelo, 1966. La formazione della filosofia di K. L.
Reinhold 1784–1794, Milan: Societˆ Editrice Vita e Pensioro.
* Reinhold, Ernst (ed.), 1825. Karl Leonhard Reinhold's Leben und
litterarisches Wirken, nebst einer auswahl von Briefen Kant's,
Fichte's, Jacobi's und andrer philosophierender Zeitgenossen a ihn,
Jena: Frommann.
* Röttgers, Kurt, 1974. “Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft und K. L.
Reinhold. Fallstudie zur Theoriepragmatik in Schulbildungsprozessen.”
In Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Vol. II, Part 2,
Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 789–804.
* Schrader, Wolfgang H., 1979. “Philosophie als System — Reinhold
und Fichte.” In Erneuerung der Transzendentalphilosophie im Anschluß
an Kant und Fichte, Klaus Hammacher and Albert Mues (eds.), Stuttgart-
Bad Cannstaatt, pp. 331–42.
* Schrader, Wolfgang H., 1993. “C. L. Reinholds ‘Systemwechsel’
von der Wissenschaftslehre zum rationalen Realismus Bardilis in der
Auseinandersetzung mit J. G. Fichte.” In Transzendentalphilosophie und
Spekulation, (Band 2: Der Streit um die Gestalt einer Ersten
Philosophie (1797–1807)), Walter Jaeschke (ed.), Hamburg: Meiner, pp.
85–104.
* Schrader, Wolfgang H., 1990. “‘Wir denken über keinen einzigen
Begriff gleich.’ Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Reinhold und Maimon.”
In Zur Architektonik der Vernunft, Lothar Berthold (ed.), Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, pp. 525–52.
* Schönborn, Alexander von, 1997. “Fichte und Reinhold über die
Begrenzung der Philosophie,” Fichte-Studien, 9: 241-55.
* Schönborn, Alexander von, 1991. Karl Leonard Reinhold. Eine
annotierte Bibliographie, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
* Schönborn, Alexander von, 1999. “Karl Leonhard Reinhold: ‘...
Endeavoring to keep up the pace mit unserem Zeitalter.’” In The
Emergence of German Idealism, Michael Baur and Daniel O. Dahlstrom
(eds.), Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, pp. 33–
62.
* Selling, Magnus, 1938. Studien zur Geschichte der
Transcendentalphilosophie. I. Karl Leonhard Reinholds
Elementarphilosophie in ihrem philosophiegeschichtlichen Zusammenhang,
Lund: Olsen, 1938.
* Stamm, Marcello, 1995. “Das Program des methodologischen
Monismus; Subjekttheoretische und methologische Aspekte der
Elementarphilosophie K. L. Reinholds,” Neue Hefte für Philosophie, 35:
18–31.
* Stolzenberg, Jürgen, 2003. “‘Geschichte des Selbstbewußtseins.’
Reinhold–Fichte–Schelling,” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen
Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism (Konzepte der
Rationalität/Concepts of Rationality), Karl Ameriks and Jürgen
Stolzenberg (eds.) Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 93–113.
* Teichner, Wilhelm, 1976. Rekonstruktion oder Reproduktion des
Grundes. Die Begründung der Philosophie als Wissenschaft durch Kant
und Reinhold , Bonn: Bouvier.
* Valenza, Paolo, 1994. Reinhold e Hegel, Padua: Cedam.
* Zynda, M. von, 1910. Kant – Reinhold – Fichte. Studien zur
Geschichte der Transzendentalphilosophie, Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte,
Berlin. (Reprinted Ruggell/Liechtenstein: Topos, 1980.)
Journal
* K. L. Reinhold. Alle Soglie Dell'Idealismo, Special (487 pp.)
triple issue of Archivio di Filosofia/Archives of Philosophy, LXXIII
(2005), Nos. 1–3. (Contains the proceedings of the third international
Reinhold conference, held in Rome in 2004.)
Other Internet Resources
[Please contact the author with suggestions.]
Related Entries
----
Trans. "Jeffrey":
REINHOLD was a /very sincere/ admirer of Kant and /well understood/
the period of *fermént* centering on Weimar in the late 18th --- early
19th centuries [!] --- this period is /ably explained/ by Dieter
Henrich in *Between Kant and Hegel* - his /very fine/ book about the
"gotta-be" elements of German Idealism. He was also /very disturbed/
[!!] by the *insalubrious* /Konsequenzen/ of "practical Idealism" ---
as it has come down to us from "Fichte" [Fichte] to Berdayev --- and
spent some time /gently inculcating/ the *Junge Leute* [we have heard
tell that they "know where it's at"] in the "True Principles" of
Germanity. Many *fán tutte* [Lucy?] --- that is to say, from "Los
Angeles, US" [Disquote!] on up/ there's a lot of *careful knowledge*
to 'go around' for those that /would/ ["Subjunctivity", that is]
*need* it. Like that. /Really and truly/.
Thusly: let's try Beck Hansen's version!
---- [*Idee fixe*]
On the /otha/ [!] hand: Not mine —
First published Wed Apr 30, 2003; substantive revision Mon Oct 6, 2008
Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757–1823), Austrian philosopher and first
occupant of the chair on Critical Philosophy established at the
University of Jena in 1787, first achieved fame as a proponent of
popular Enlightenment and as an early and effective popularizer of the
Kantian philosophy. During his period at the University of Jena (1787–
94), Reinhold proclaimed the need for a more “scientific” and
systematic presentation of the Critical philosophy, one based upon a
single, self-evident first principle. In an effort to satisfy this
need, he expounded his own “Elementary Philosophy” in a series of
influential works between 1789 and 1791. Though Reinhold's Elementary
Philosophy was much criticized, his call for a more coherent and
systematic exposition of transcendental idealism exercised a profound
influence upon the subsequent development of post-Kantian idealism and
spurred others (such as J. G. Fichte) to seek a philosophical first
principle even more “fundamental” than Reinhold's own “Principle of
Consciousness.” After moving to the University of Kiel, Reinhold
became an adherent, first of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre and then of
C. G. Bardili's “rational realism,” before finally proposing a novel
“linguistic” approach to philosophical problems.
* 1. Reinhold's Life and Work
* 2. The "Elementary Philosophy"
* 3. Reception of Reinhold's Philosophy
* Bibliography
o Reinhold's Works in German and English in Chronological
Order
o Selected Secondary Literature about Reinhold
* Other Internet Resources
* Related Entries
1. Reinhold's Life and Work
Karl Leonhard Reinhold was born in Vienna October 26, 1757 (though
many older sources erroneously give 1758 as his year of his birth). He
studied at the Jesuit Seminary in Vienna for a year, until the order
was suppressed in 1773, at which time he entered the Barnabite
seminary. Following his ordination, he became a Barnabite monk and
served for several years as a parish priest and teacher of philosophy.
Reinhold's first publications were book reviews and short essays in
popular newspapers, in which he showed himself to be a zealous
advocate of Josephite reforms and an enthusiastic exponent of radical
Enlightenment and religious toleration.
In 1783 Reinhold moved to Leipzig and converted to Protestantism. He
also became a Freemason and a member of the Illuminati, and he
remained an active Freemason until the end of his life. Possessed of a
restless, inquiring spirit, Reinhold's early intellectual trajectory
led him from orthodox Catholicism, to reformed Catholicism, to
materialism and atheism, and then to Leibnizianism and to Humean
skepticism. Yet he always remained true to the ideal of
“Enlightenment,” at least as he understood that ideal, and he never
ceased to insist that philosophy ought to make a practical difference
in the world. For all of his forays into the most technical and arcane
philosophical debates and issues, he never wavered in his insistence
that true “popularity” must remain the goal of philosophy, and that
the ultimate test of any system is its capacity for convincing
everyone of its truth. Enlightenment, for Reinhold, was no abstract
pursuit of truth, but a program of religious, moral, social, and
political reform. Coupled with this commitment to popularity, was a
pedagogic zeal to do everything in his power to spread the message of
popular Enlightenment — whether in its materialist, its neo-
Leibnizian, its skeptical, its Kantian, its Fichtean, its Bardilian,
or its distinctively “Reinholdian” form — as widely and as effectively
as possible.
In 1784, after studying philosophy for a semester in Leipzig, Reinhold
moved to Weimar, where he became a confidant (and son-in-law) of C. M.
Wieland and a regular contributor to Wieland's widely read Der
Teutsche Merkur. It was in this journal that his famous series of
“Letters on the Kantian Philosophy” began to appear in 1786. It is
with these “Letters,” which were subsequently published in revised and
expanded form in two volumes, that Reinhold's name enters the history
of philosophy. What Reinhold found in Kant is clearly expressed in the
first of his many private letters to the latter: namely, a way to
resolve the debilitating conflict between faith and reason,
“superstition” and “disbelief,” “heart” and “head.” And this is
precisely the aspect of the new, Critical philosophy that is
emphasized in his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy: not Kant's
radical new account of space and time, nor his audacious effort to
provide a transcendental deduction of the pure categories of the
understanding, but rather the conclusions and implications of the
“transcendental dialectic.”
Kantianism was recommended by Reinhold, above all, for its allegedly
salubrious and enlightened practical consequences, particular with
respect to religion and morality. It was not for nothing that Reinhold
described this new philosophy to readers of Die Teutscher Merkur as
“the gospel of pure reason.” Rational belief in God, in the
immortality of the soul, in the reality of free will: such are the
articles of this new “gospel” — a gospel promulgated, everyone agreed,
far more effectively and popularly by Reinhold than by Kant himself.
Even Kant professed to be charmed by Reinhold's effort and gratified
by his success.
On the strength of his newfound fame as author of the Letters,
Reinhold was invited to be the inaugural occupant of the first
professorial chair devoted exclusively to the new Kantian philosophy,
and thus he began lecturing at the University of Jena in 1787. First
at Jena, and then later at the University of Kiel, Reinhold proved to
be an immensely popular and influential teacher, much beloved by his
students. (Of the approximately 860 students enrolled in Jena in the
Spring Semester of 1794, 600 were enrolled in Reinhold's three lecture
courses.) Indeed, Reinhold was largely responsible for making Jena the
center of German philosophy, which it remained for the next several
decades.
In his published Letters on the Kantian Philosophy Reinhold had
excused himself from the task of presenting and examining the
theoretical foundations of Kant's Critical philosophy, in order to
concentrate instead upon the practical consequences of the same. But
once he arrived at Jena he set himself to the former task, the
surprising result of which was not so much the popularization of
another aspect of Kant's thought as a first, historically momentous
effort to revise and recast the theoretical foundations of the new
transcendental idealism in a new, allegedly more coherent and
systematic form. The fruit of this revisionist effort was Reinhold's
own “Elementary Philosophy” (see below), which, though only a passing
phase in Reinhold's own development as a philosopher, remains his most
substantial and effective contribution to the historical development
of German Idealism.
Reinhold's Elementary Philosophy is most fully expounded in three
works he published in rapid succession during his tenure at the
University of Jena: Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen
Vorstellungsvermögens [Attempt a New Theory of the Human Power of
Representation] (1789), Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger
Missverständnisse der Philosophen, Erster Band [Contributions toward
Correcting the Previous Misunderstandings of Philosophers, Vol. I]
(1790), and Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens [On the
Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge] (1791).
Reinhold's radical revision and implicit critique of orthodox
Kantianism exercised an immediate and immense influence upon his
contemporaries, and particularly upon the philosopher who followed him
at Jena in 1794, namely Johann Gottlieb Fichte. But though Fichte was
thoroughly convinced by Reinhold's arguments for the incompleteness of
Kant's own presentation of the Critical philosophy and by his demand
for an immediately certain “first principle” of the same, he was not
satisfied with Reinhold's own efforts to satisfy these demands and, in
the Aenesidemus review and elsewhere, made public his own criticisms
of the Elementary Philosophy and of Reinhold's “Principle of
Consciousness.” For a few years following Fichte's arrival in Jena and
Reinhold's transfer to Kiel, the two men engaged in a wide-ranging and
stimulating philosophical correspondence, though they never met.
The final upshot of Reinhold's Auseinandersetzung with Fichte was the
former's recantation of his own Elementary Philosophy and transference
of his allegiance to the standpoint of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre.
This conversion was made public in early 1798, in a lengthy review
essay in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung of Fichte's recent writings,
and it was elaborated the following year in Reinhold's Ueber die
Paradoxien der neuesten Philosophie [Concerning the Paradoxes of the
most recent Philosophy], in which he explicitly acknowledged the
inadequacy of his own Principle of Consciousness as the foundation of
philosophy as a whole and endorsed Fichte's proposal for a more
“active” first principle (the Tathandlung, or “fact-act” of the I's
self-positing), which would be capable of fully integrating
theoretical with practical reason, as well as uniting theoretical and
practical philosophy.
As his contribution to the Atheism Controversy of 1798/99, which led
to Fichte's departure from Jena, Reinhold published a pamphlet in
Fichte's defense. However, it was not long before he grew dissatisfied
with what he perceived to be the “one-sidedness” of Fichte's
philosophy — and indeed, of transcendental idealism as a whole — and
publicly sought some “third way,” which could reconcile the opposing
positions of Fichte and Jacobi (whose contribution to the Atheism
Controversy was an influential “Open letter,” criticizing philosophy
in general and Fichte's transcendental idealism in particular as
“nihilism.”) This effort on Reinhold's part to mediate the differences
between the transcendental idealist “philosopher of freedom” (Fichte)
and the common-sense “non-philosopher of faith” (Jacobi) pleased
neither party, and signaled the quick and abrupt end of Reinhold's
short-lived “Fichte phase.”
After resolutely turning his back on the new post-Kantian idealist
philosophy that he himself had done so much to instigate, Reinhold now
presented himself to the public, in the six issues of his own Beyträge
zur leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beym Anfange
des 19. Jahrhunderts [Contributions to an Easier Overview of the State
of Philosophy at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century] (1801–1803),
as a partisan of the “logical realism” of C. G. Bardili, which was an
effort to base philosophy upon pure logic and upon an appeal to what
Bardili called “thinking qua thinking.” It was this effort on
Reinhold's part, in the first issue of the Beyträge, “to reduce
philosophy to logic” that drew the sarcastic ire of Hegel in his
notorious appendix to his Differenz des Fichte'schen und
Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie [Difference between the
Fichtean and Schellingian System of Philosophy] (1801)
Soon enough, however, Reinhold became dissatisfied with Bardili's
position as well, and began publicly to criticize the same “from the
standpoint of language” and to reject all efforts to ground philosophy
in pure formal logic. Reinhold's final project as a philosopher can be
described as a pioneering effort to take seriously the implications of
ordinary language for philosophy itself and to insist upon the
intimate relationship between speaking and thinking. These writings of
Reinhold's final years went nearly unnoticed during his own lifetime
and have generally remained unknown until the present day; yet they
would appear to merit the attention of contemporary philosophers and
scholars, inasmuch as they anticipate in certain ways the “linguistic
turn” of so much subsequent philosophy
After a lifetime of philosophical inquiry, during which he influenced
countless readers and students, while himself moving restlessly from
one theoretical standpoint to another, Reinhold died in Kiel in 1823.
2. The "Elementary Philosophy"
No sooner did he begin lecturing on the first Critique than Reinhold
began to have serious doubts about the completeness of Kant's
philosophy, the soundness of its theoretical foundations, and the
adequacy of Kant's own arguments and deductions. With remarkable
alacrity and considerable ingenuity, he took it upon himself to remedy
these perceived defects in Kant's own presentation and to construct
his own, allegedly more systematic, well-grounded, and “universally
acceptable” version of the new Critical philosophy.
Though Reinhold sometimes referred to his new system simply as
“philosophy without a nickname,” it soon became known by another name
that he used for it, namely: “Elementary Philosophy” or “Philosophy of
the Elements” [Elementarphilosophie]. After introducing his new
philosophical ideas in his own lectures, Reinhold began laying them
before the public in a series of essays in popular and professional
journals, essays which were then revised and expanded as chapters of
the three books which together constitute his “official” exposition of
the Elementary Philosophy: Versuch einer neuen Theorie des
menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens (1789), Beyträge zur Berichtigung
bisheriger Missverständnisse der Philosophen, Erster Band (1790), and
Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (1791).
Reinhold introduced his presentation of the Elementary Philosophy with
the following “metaphilosophical” questions: How is philosophy
possible as a strict science, and what is the distinguishing feature
of such a science? Following Kant, as well as the entire rationalist
tradition, Reinhold maintained that the essence of science lies in
universality and necessity. But these are properties of thought, not
of sensation or intuition. Only through thinking and judging can we
recognize universality and necessity, a recognition that is, in turn,
formulated and expressed in concepts and propositions. The business of
philosophy is therefore to establish “universally
valid” [allgemeingültig] propositions in a manner that allows their
necessity and universality to be universally recognized as binding
upon everyone [allgemeingeltend]. This last requirement reveals the
intimate link between Reinhold's earlier efforts at “popularizing” the
Kantian philosophy and his subsequent efforts to expand and to ground
this same system. One of the constant hallmarks of Reinhold's
philosophical efforts was his conviction that a genuinely scientific
philosophy must be capable of being understood and recognized as true
by everyone.
What makes philosophy “scientific,” according to Reinhold, is not
simply that it consists of propositions arrived at by thinking, but
rather, the logical connection between the propositions in question —
that is, their systematic form. Over and over again, in one forum
after another, Reinhold trumpeted the same declaration: scientific
philosophy is systematic philosophy. Accordingly, he embarked upon an
influential analysis of systematic form as such, in order to gain
insight into how Kantianism could be made rigorously systematic and
therefore genuinely “scientific.”
The fundamental hallmarks of systematic form, according to Reinhold,
are consistency and completeness, but it was the former of these that
attracted most of Reinhold's attention. The only way to be sure that
any two propositions are truly consistent with one another — and
hence, the only way to determine whether a number of philosophical
propositions actually constitute a “system” — is to show that they can
all be traced back to the same first principle or foundation
[Grundsatz]. And the only way to show that they can indeed be “traced
back” to such a first principle is by actually “deriving” them
therefrom. (Despite his efforts to clarify this point, Reinhold's
conception of philosophical “derivation” — which is apparently not to
be understood as simple logical deduction — nevertheless remains
extraordinarily murky.)
It follows that a philosophical system must begin with a single first
principle, which “determines” all the other propositions of the
system. (Here again, there is a certain obscurity in Reinhold's claim,
inasmuch as he insisted that the first principle “determines” only the
“form” and not the “content” of all the other, subordinate
propositions, yet he also described the relationship between the first
principle and the subordinate principles as a “syllogism,” in which
the latter are “derived” from the former.) Only if propositions are
logically related to one another in this manner can they constitute a
“system.” A system with two or more “first principles” is not a system
at all, but several different systems. As for the completeness
problem, Reinhold's implicit solution seems to have been to seek an a
priori first principle that could be known in advance to encompass the
entire domain of experience, and hence of philosophy.
What, however, can one say about the truth (or, as Reinhold was more
likely to say, the “validity” [Gültigkeit]) of the proposed first
principle itself? If the validity of a philosophical proposition is
determined by its systematic, logical connection to other
propositions, then what determines the truth of the first principle,
from which the system as a whole is generated or derived? The answer,
Reinhold thought, is obvious: the first principle and systematic
starting point of philosophy must be self-evident. It must be
immediately certain.
Despite reservations concerning the capacity of the first principle to
determine the content, as opposed to the form, of the propositions
derived from it, Reinhold unequivocally maintained that the first
principle of all philosophy had to be a material (or synthetic) as
well as a formal (or analytic) principle. Otherwise, “scientific
philosophy” would be identical to formal logic and would have no
content of its own, which Reinhold (at this point anyway) staunchly
denied. Moreover, according to Reinhold, the establishment of such a
universally valid and immediately certain first principle is not
merely a pressing requirement of theoretical reason, but also a matter
of the utmost practical urgency, inasmuch as in the absence of such a
foundational first principle “philosophy itself is impossible as a
science, in which case the basis for our ethical duties and rights —
as well as those duties and rights themselves — must remain forever
undecided” (Beyträge I, p. 367).
Granted, then, that a system of philosophy must begin with a single,
immediately certain, synthetic first proposition or “grounding
principle”: where might one turn in order to discover and to recognize
the first principle in question, a proposition that alone can serve as
the foundation or “ground” of all other philosophical propositions and
cannot itself be established by any argument? The answer is, we must
turn within — to the consideration of consciousness itself. This,
Reinhold maintained, is precisely what Kant (not to mention Descartes)
had done, albeit he did not succeed in presenting the fruits of his
inquiries in an adequately scientific and systematic form.
What then is the “first principle” of the Elementary Philosophy? It is
the “Principle of Consciousness,” namely, the proposition that “in
consciousness, the subject distinguishes the representation from the
subject and the object and relates the representation to
both” (Beyträge I, p. 167). In this proposition, the term
“representation” [Vorstellung] designates whatever we are directly
conscious of whenever we are conscious of anything whatsoever; the
term “subject” designates the one who “is conscious” of whatever one
is conscious of (the “conscious subject” or “subject of
consciousness”); and the term “object” designates that “of which” the
representation is a representation (the intentional object of
consciousness, that to which the representation “refers”).
Though “self-evident” and “universally valid,” the proposition
asserting this tripartite character of consciousness is, according to
Reinhold, not analytic but synthetic. The Principle of Consciousness
is not a tautology, yet anyone who reflects upon what is asserted by
this principle will immediately recognize its truth and universal
validity, inasmuch as it expresses what Reinhold called a “universally
recognized fact of consciousness.”
Self-evidence alone, however, is not enough. One of the chief merits
of the Principle of Consciousness, according to Reinhold, is that from
it one can then derive the starting point of Kant's own philosophy,
which appears to begin with a sheer, ungrounded assumption of the
distinction between intuiting and thinking, the difference between
theoretical and practical reason, etc. From this point, Reinhold
assures us, one can then proceed to the derivation of a complete
system of philosophy as a whole, as envisioned but never actually
accomplished by Kant himself. (One must recall that Reinhold's work on
Elementary Philosophy preceded Kant's third Critique.)
With the Principle of Consciousness Reinhold believed he had uncovered
that “common root” of thought and sensibility, which Kant had declared
to be unknowable. By commencing his analysis at the level of
“representations as such,” Reinhold was convinced that he had, so to
speak, hit philosophical rock bottom, inasmuch as all consciousness is
self-evidently “representational” in character. (Fichte, however, in
his Aenesidemus review and his early writings on the
Wissenschaftslehre, would subsequently challenge precisely this
claim.) Thus, Reinhold's “Theory of Representation” (which is the
first section of the Elementary Philosophy) purports to provide Kant's
Critical philosophy with the very foundation it so sorely lacks. And
the Principle of Consciousness is, in turn, the foundational or first
principle of this new Theory of Representation — and hence the first
principle of philosophy as a whole.
By far the most original and influential portion of the Elementary
Philosophy is its first part, the Theory of Representation, which is
devoted entirely to an analysis of our fundamental spiritual power —
the power of representation itself [Vorstellungsvermögen] — in an
effort to determine “everything that can be known a priori concerning
the representations of sensibility, understanding, and reason.” This
foundational portion of the Elementary Philosophy thus purports to
provide a thorough and complete analysis of the necessary features of
representation qua representation, an analysis that claims to show
“that space, time, the twelve categories, and the three forms of the
ideas are originally nothing but properties of mere
representations” (Fundament, pp. 72–73). This same analysis of our
power of representation also claims to establish the distinction
between the form and content of representations, the necessity of both
receptivity and spontaneity on the part of the power of
representation, the necessary multiplicity of sensations, and the
unknowability of things in themselves.
If Reinhold displays considerable originality and ingenuity in
deriving the above mentioned results from his first principle (the
Principle of Consciousness), the same cannot be said of the subsequent
section of the Elementary Philosophy, the “Theory of the Power of
Cognition,” which follows Kant's own exposition much more closely than
the Theory of the Power of Representation and becomes increasingly
schematic — and less convincing — as it advances. (Reinhold's sole
attempt at complete exposition of his “Theory of the Power of
Cognition” is roughly sketched in Book 3 of the Versuch, whereas the
“Theory of the Power of Representation” is treated in elaborate detail
in all three of his book-length presentations of the Elementary
Philosophy.)
One may recall that Reinhold's intention was to provide a new
foundation not merely for the “theoretical philosophy” expounded by
Kant in the first Critique, but for the Critical philosophy as a
whole, including Kant's practical philosophy. In fact, however,
Reinhold provided his readers with only the barest hints of how his
Elementary Philosophy might embrace Kant's account of will and of
practical reason. Significantly, this occurs in the final, 19 page
section of his “Theory of the Power of Cognition,” entitled “Theory of
the Power of Desire,” in which Reinhold limits himself to what he
himself describes as the mere “outline” of a strategy for
demonstrating the unity of theoretical and practical reason: if
willing is the condition for the possibility of actual, as opposed to
merely possible representation and cognition, then the “power of
desire” conditions the powers of cognition and representation.
Unfortunately, Reinhold never fleshed out this fascinating outline,
never provided any arguments for the same, and never indicated how
this provocative claim concerning the relation of willing to knowing
could be reconciled with the “immediate certainties” of his starting
point. And this was precisely what provoked his most brilliant and
critical reader, J. G. Fichte to attempt his own version of an
Elementary Philosophy — a version that would begin with the unity of
the theoretical and the practical and that would, with the act of
“positing” or Setzen, claim to have discovered a starting point even
more “basic” than that of mere “representation.” (It is significant
that Fichte's unpublished notebook of 1793/94, in which he first
sketched what would subsequently be known as the Wissenschaftslehre or
“Theory of Scientific Knowledge,” was titled “Private Meditations on
Elementary Philosophy/Practical Philosophy.”)
It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence of Reinhold's
inquiries into systematicity and first principles upon an entire
generation of philosophers. Though some recent research on Reinhold
and the “Jena circle” of the late 1780s has stressed the degree to
which Reinhold himself soon came to have doubts about the project of
“philosophy from a single principle” (see the work of Dieter Henrich
and his students, such as Marcello Stamm), this project was
nevertheless enthusiastically embraced by Fichte and the young
Schelling, and inspired others, notably Hegel, to re-examine (and to
question) the alleged connection between systematic form and self-
evident first principles. Reinhold's subsequent reservations about his
own Elementary Philosophy notwithstanding, the Elementary Philosophy
remains one of the clearest examples of a thoroughgoing
“foundationalist” project in the history of European philosophy.
3. Reception of Reinhold's Philosophy
During Reinhold's own lifetime, or at least during certain phases of
the same, he was among the more influential philosophers in Germany —
first as an immensely successful popularizer of the Kantian revolution
and then, with his effort to construct an Elementary Philosophy, as
one of the founders of “post-Kantian idealism.” This, however, nearly
exhausts his positive influence upon his contemporaries.
Following the heyday of German idealism, Reinhold's name has generally
been relegated to the history of philosophy, within which he is
assigned the role of serving as a small, but not insignificant rung on
the alleged ladder “from Kant to Hegel,” and this is precisely how he
is still treated in most general histories of philosophy (as well as
in this entry). In this context, Reinhold is usually credited with (or
blamed for) putting the issues of systematic form and “philosophical
foundations” at the center of philosophical concern. Even those, such
as Fichte, who roundly criticized the details of his Elementary
Philosophy professed sincere admiration for Reinhold's “systematic
spirit.” And many of those who rejected his contention that the
Principle of Consciousness could serve as the first principle of a
philosophy as a whole, nevertheless praised him as the philosopher who
first recognized the need for some such principle and first sought to
provide Kantianism with a solid “foundation.” In both of these
respects, Reinhold served as an important catalyst or stimulus for
further philosophical developments.
Given this situation, it his hardly surprising that — with a few minor
exceptions — the only works of Reinhold familiar even to most
scholars, as well as the only writings by him to be reissued after his
lifetime, were the Letters on the Kantian Philosophy and the three,
above-mentioned volumes in which he expounded his Elementary
Philosophy. This, however, is unfortunate, inasmuch as these texts
represent only a small fraction of Reinhold's literary output and do
not include some of his most original ideas, projects, and literary
productions, such as his final writings on philosophy and language and
his pioneering, lifelong efforts to get philosophers to take seriously
the history of their own discipline and to understand the “history of
philosophy” philosophically.
This situation has recently begun to change, however. A critical
edition of Reinhold's voluminous and important philosophical
correspondence was inaugurated in 1983 (though only one of the
projected ten volumes has appeared to date), and plans are currently
afoot for an edition — the first ever — of Reinhold's complete works.
Newly edited editions of some of Reinhold's major works have also
begun to appear, most notably the two volumes of his Beyträge zur
Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der Philosophen, edited by
Alessandro Lazzari and issued in the "Philosophische Bibliothek"
series published by Felix Meiner.
For many years, the serious secondary literary on Reinhold was very
sparse and was dominated by Alfred Klimmt's monograph (see below).
Recent years, however, have seen a spate of new articles and
monographs devoted to Reinhold, the most significant of which are the
works by Wolfgang Schrader and the recent, groundbreaking book by
Martin Bondeli. Also worth mentioning is Alexander von Schönborn's
annotated bibliography of Reinhold's writings, a fine example of
scholarly detective work and an essential tool for further research.
In conjunction with and as part of the renaissance of Fichte studies
over the past four decades, there have been numerous efforts to
reexamine the relationship between Reinhold and Fichte, and, in
particular, to reassess the precise debt of the Wissenschaftslehre to
the Elementary Philosophy. Accordingly, the scholarly literature on
Fichte includes numerous studies of this aspect of Reinhold's
achievement.
Even more recently and for the first time ever, Reinhold's ideas have
begun to be expounded, criticized, and debated among Anglophone
scholars and philosophers, including Karl Ameriks, Frederick C.
Beiser, Daniel Breazeale, Paul Franks, and Alexander von Schönborn. A
recent annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American
Philosophical Association featured a session devoted almost entirely
to a debate (between Ameriks and Breazeale) over Reinhold's actual
contribution to post-Kantian philosophy and the merits of his
position. Such a debate would have been unimaginable even a few
decades ago.
Appreciation and discussion of Reinhold among Anglophone readers is,
however, not likely to spread very widely until more of Reinhold's
writings have become available in English. Until very recently the
English reader had to make do with incomplete translations of two
works by Reinhold: one, by George di Giovanni, of excerpts from the
Fundament and another, by Sabine Rohr, of portions of the Verhandlung
über die Grundbegriffe und Grundsätze der Moralität aus dem
Gesichtspunke des gemeinen und gesunden Verstandes. In 2005 a fine
translation of the first series of Reinhold's "Letters on the Kantian
Philosophy," translated by James Hebbeler and edited by Karl Ameriks,
was published as the series of "Cambridge Texts in the History of
Philosophy." However, the rest of Reinhold's philosophical writings
still await English translation.
In 1998 Reinhold's philosophy was the subject of an international
academic conference — the first such conference ever to be devoted to
Reinhold — in Bad Homburg, Germany. The second international Reinhold
conference was held in Luzern, Switzerland in 2002; the third, in
Rome, Italy in 2004; and the fourth in Montreal, Canada in 2007. (The
published Proceedings of the first three of these conferences have
already appeared and those of the fourth are forthcoming.) The level
of scholarship and philosophical acumen on display at these two events
was very high and augurs well for the future. Indeed, one could argue
that the future of Reinhold Studies is brighter today than at any time
since Reinhold's death.
Bibliography
Reinhold's Works in German and English in Chronological Order
(Note that almost all of Reinhold's books consist of revised versions
of material that originally appeared in the form of journal articles.
For a complete listing of all of Reinhold's writings, see the
bibliography by Alexander von Schönborn.)
* Schriften zur Religionskritik und Aufklärung, 1782–1784, ed. Zwi
Batscha (Bremen: Jacobi-Verlag, 1977).
* Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie[Erster Band] (1790). (Both
volumes reprinted in a single volume, ed. Raymund Schmidt [Leipzig:
Reclam, 1921]. English translation of the first eight letters in the
versions originally published in Der Teutsche Merkur, supplemented by
"the major additions in the 1790 edition," in Letters on the Kantian
Philosophy, trans. James Hebbeler, ed. Karl Ameriks. [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005].)
* Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen
Vorstellungsvermögens (1789; 2nd ed. 1795). (Photomechanical reprint
ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963.)
* Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der
Philosophen, Erster Band (1790). (New edition, edited and with an
introduction by Faustino Fabbianell. [Hamburg: Meiner/Philosophische
Bibliothek 554a, 2003]. A photomechancial reprint of Sect. V of this
work, “Ueber die Möglichkeit der Philosophie als strenge
Wissenschaft,” is included in the volume containing the
photomechanical reprint edition ofUeber das Fundament des
philosophischen Wissens, ed. Wolfgang H. Schrader [Hamburg: Meiner,
1978].)
* Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (1791).
(Photomechanical reprint edition, ed. Wolfgang H. Schrader [Hamburg:
Meiner, 1978]. Partial translation, The Foundation of Philosophical
Knowledge, trans. George di Giovonni. In Between Kant and Hegel: Texts
in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, ed. George di Giovanni
and H. S. Harris [Albany: SUNY Press, 1985], pp. 52–106.)
* Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie, Zweyter Band (1792).
(Both volumes of the Briefe were later reprinted in a single volume,
ed. Raymund Schmidt [Leipzig: Reclam, 1921].)
* Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der
Philosophen, Zweyter Band (1794). (New edition, edited and with an
introduction by Faustino Fabbianell. [Hamburg: Meiner/Philosophische
Bibliothek 554b, 2004.])
* Auswahl vermischter Schriften [Erster Theil] (1796).
* Auswahl vermischter Schriften, Zweyter Theil (1797).
* Review of Fichte's, Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre,
Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, Grundrisse des
Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre in Rücksicht auf das
theoretische Vermögen, and Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft
Teutscher Gelehrten, Band 5, Heft 1–6. (1798). (Rpt. in J. G. Fichte
in zeitgenössischen Rezensionen, Band 2, ed. Erich Fuchs, Wilhelm G.
Jacobs, and Walter Schieche, pp. 286–321 [Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt:
Frommann-Holzboog, 1995].)
* Verhandlung über die Grundbegriffe und Grundsätze der Moralität
aus dem Gesichtspunke des gemeinen und gesunden Verstandes (1798).
(Partial translation in Sabine Roehr, A Primer on German
Enlightenment: With a Translation of Karl Leonhard Reinhold's “The
Fundamental Concepts and Principles of Ethics” [Columbia: University
of Missouri Press, 1995], pp. 157–251.)
* Ueber die Paradoxien der neuesten Philosophie (1799).
* Sendschreiben an J. C. Lavater und J. G. Fichte über den Glauben
an Gott (1799).
* Beyträge zur leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie
beym Anfange des 19. Jahrhunderts, Heft 1–3 (1801), Heft 4 (1802),
Heft 5–6 (1803). (This journal was founded and edited by Reinhold, who
also contributed most of the editorial content.)
* C. G. Bardilis und C. L. Reinholds Briefwechsel über das Wesen
der Philosophie und das Unwesen der Speculation (1804).
* Prologomena zur Analysis in der Philosophie (1804).
* Etwas über den Widerspruch (1804).
* C. L. Reinhold's Anleitung zur Kenntniß und Beurtheilung der
Philosophie in ihren sämmtlichen Lehregebäuden (1805; 2nd ed. 1824).
* Versuch einer Auflösung der von der philosophischen Classe der
königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin für 1805 aufgestellten
Aufgabe: “Die Natur der Analysis und der analytischen Methode in der
Philosophie genau anzugeben, und zu untersuchen: ob und was es für
Mittel gebe, ihren Gebrauch sicher, leichter und nützlicher zu
machen” (1805).
* Versuch einer Critik der Logik aus dem Gesichtspunkte der
Sprache (1806).
* Die Anfangsgründe der Erkenntniß der Wahrheit in einer Fibel für
noch unbefriedigte Forscher nach dieser Erkenntiß (1808).
* Rüge einer merkürdigen Sprachverwirrung unter den Weltweisen
(1809).
* Grundlegung einer Synonymik für den allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch
in den philosophischen Wissenschaften (1812).
* Das menschliche Erkenntnißvermögen, aus dem Gesichtspunkte des
durch die Wortsprache vermittelten Zusammenhang zwischen der
Sinnlichkeit und dem Denkvermögen (1816).
* Ueber den Begriff und die Erkenntniß der Wahrheit (1817).
* Die alte Frage: Was ist die Wahrheit? bey den erneuerten
Streitigkeiten über die göttliche Offenbarung und die menschliche
Vernunft, in nähere Erwägung gezogen (1820).
* Karl Leonhard Reinhold Korrespondenzausgabe der österreichischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vol. I, ed. Reinhard Lauth, Eberhard
Heller, and Karl Hiller (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog,
1983). Nine more volumes of this edition are projected.
Selected Secondary Literature About Reinhold
* Adam, Herbert, 1930. Carl Leonhard Reinholds philosophischer
Systemwechsel, Heidelberg: Carl Winter.
* Ahlers, Rolf, 2003. “Fichte, Jacobi und Reinhold über
Speculation und Leben,” Fichte-Studien, 21: 1–25.
* Ameriks, Karl, 2000. Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in
the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy, New York: Cambridge
University Press. (On Reinhold, see Pt. II, pp. 81–159.)
* Beiser, Frederick C., 1987. The Fate of Reason: German
Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
(On Reinhold, see Ch. 8, pp. 226–65.)
* Bondeli, Martin, 1995. Das Anfangsproblem bei Karl Leonhard
Reinhold. Eine systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche
Untersuchung zur Philosophie Reinholds in der Zeit von 1789 bis 1803,
Frankfurt: Klostermann.
* Bondeli, Martin, 2001. “Freiheit im Anschluss an Kant. Zur Kant-
Reinhold-Kontroverse und ihren Folgen.” In Akten des IX
Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, V. Gerhardt, R.-P. Horstmann, and R.
Schumacher (eds.), Berlin: de Gruyter.
* Bondeli, Martin, 1994. “Geschmack und Vergnügen in Reinholds
Aufklärungskonzept und philosophischem Programm während der Phase der
Elementarphilosophie.” In Evolution des Geistes: Jena um 1800, F.
Strack (ed.), Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 328-49.
* Bondeli, Martin, 1995. “Hegel und Reinhold,” Hegel-Studien, 30:
45-87.
* Bondeli, Martin, 1998. “Hegel und Reinholds Rationaler
Rationalismus.” In Hegels Jenaer Naturphilosophie, Munich: Fink
Verlag.
* Bondeli, Martin, 1997. “Hegels Identitätsphilosophie in
Auseinandersetzung mit Reinholds Rationalem Realismus.” In Hegels
Jenaer Naturphilosophie, K. Vieweg (ed.), Paderborn/München: W. Fink,
pp. 163–74.
* Bondeli, Martin and W. H. Schrader (eds.), 2003. Die Philosophie
Karl Leonhard Reinholds. (Beiträge der Internationalen Reinhold-Tagung
von Bad Homburg, März 1998), Amsterdam: Rodopi.
* Bondeli, Martin and Alessandro Lazzari (eds.), 2003. Philosophie
ohne Beinamen. System, Freiheit und Geschichte im Denken C.L.
Reinholds, Basel: Schwabe-Verlag, 2003. (Proceedings of the second
international Reinhold conference, held in Lucerne in 2002.)
* Bondili, Martin, 1997. “Reinhold im Lichte Kants und Hegels. Zu
G.W. Fuchs: C.L. Reinhold – Illuminat und Philosoph; P. Valenza:
Reinhold e Hegel,” Hegel-Studien, 31: 159-66.
* Bondili, Martin, 1998. “Von Herder zu Kant, zwischen Kant und
Herder, mit Herder gegen Kant – Karl Leonhard Reinhold.” In Herder und
die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, M. Heinz (ed.), Amsterdam,
Atlanta: Rodopi, pp. 203–34.
* Bondili, Martin, 1997. “Zu Fichtes Kritik an Reinholds
‘empirischem’ Satz des Bewußtseins,” Fichte-Studien, 9: 199-213.
* Breazeale, Daniel, 1982. “Between Kant and Fichte: Karl Leonhard
Reinhold's ‘Elementary Philosophy,’” Review of Metaphysics, 35: 785–
821.
* Breazeale, Daniel, 1998. “Putting Doubt in its Place: Karl
Leonhard Reinhold on the Relationship between Philosophical Skepticism
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J. van der Zande and R. H. Popkin (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 119–
32.
* Cloeren, Hermann-Joseph, 1972. “Philosophie als Sprachkritik bei
K. L. Reinhold. Interpretative Bemerkungen zu seiner Spätphilosophie,”
Kant-Studien, 63: 225-36.
* Fabienelli, Faustino (ed.), 2003. Die zeitgenössischen
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* Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 1794. “Recenzion des
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Press, 1988, pp. 59–77.)
* Frank, Manfred, 1997. “Unendliche Annäherung”: Die Anfänge der
philosophischen Frühromantik, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. (On
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* Franks, Paul, 2000. “All or Nothing: Systematicity and Nihilism
in Jacobi, Reinhold, and Maimon.” In The Cambridge Companion to German
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* Fuchs, Gerhard W., 1994. Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Illuminat und
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* Hegel, G.W.F., 1801. Differenz des Fichte'schen und
Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie. (The Difference Between
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deutschen Idealismus, Hamburg: Meiner.
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* Lazzari, Alessandro, 2004. “Das Eine, was der Menscheit Noth
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Representation and the Linguistic Transformation of Kantism. Münster:
Nodus. (For Reinhold, see Chs. 2 and 5.)
* Pinkard, Terry, 2002. German Philosophy 1760–1869; The Legacy of
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* Pupi, Angelo, 1966. La formazione della filosofia di K. L.
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* Reinhold, Ernst (ed.), 1825. Karl Leonhard Reinhold's Leben und
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18–31.
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Reinhold–Fichte–Schelling,” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen
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* Teichner, Wilhelm, 1976. Rekonstruktion oder Reproduktion des
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* Valenza, Paolo, 1994. Reinhold e Hegel, Padua: Cedam.
* Zynda, M. von, 1910. Kant – Reinhold – Fichte. Studien zur
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Journal
* K. L. Reinhold. Alle Soglie Dell'Idealismo, Special (487 pp.)
triple issue of Archivio di Filosofia/Archives of Philosophy, LXXIII
(2005), Nos. 1–3. (Contains the proceedings of the third international
Reinhold conference, held in Rome in 2004.)
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Related Entries
----
Trans. "Jeffrey":
REINHOLD was a /very sincere/ admirer of Kant and /well understood/
the period of *fermént* centering on Weimar in the late 18th --- early
19th centuries [!] --- this period is /ably explained/ by Dieter
Henrich in *Between Kant and Hegel* - his /very fine/ book about the
"gotta-be" elements of German Idealism. He was also /very disturbed/
[!!] by the *insalubrious* /Konsequenzen/ of "practical Idealism" ---
as it has come down to us from "Fichte" [Fichte] to Berdayev --- and
spent some time /gently inculcating/ the *Junge Leute* [we have heard
tell that they "know where it's at"] in the "True Principles" of
Germanity. Many *fán tutte* [Lucy?] --- that is to say, from "Los
Angeles, US" [Disquote!] on up/ there's a lot of *careful knowledge*
to 'go around' for those that /would/ ["Subjunctivity", that is]
*need* it. Like that. /Really and truly/.
Thusly: let's try Beck Hansen's version!
---- [*Idee fixe*]
On the /otha/ [!] hand: Not mine —