Big Red Jeff Rubard
2010-02-06 22:11:22 UTC
The true American Empiric ---
-------------------
/John Locke/
Essay concerning *Human* Understanding
c. 1690
Chapter XXI
Of the Division of the Sciences
1. Science may be divided into three sorts. All that can fall within
the compass of human understanding, being either, First, the nature of
things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner
of operation: or, Secondly, that which man himself ought to do, as a
rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end,
especially happiness: or, Thirdly, the ways and means whereby the
knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and
communicated; I think science may be divided properly into these three
sorts:--
2. Physica. First, The knowledge of things, as they are in their own
proper beings, their constitution, properties, and operations; whereby
I mean not only matter and body, but spirits also, which have their
proper natures, constitutions, and operations, as well as bodies.
This, in a little more enlarged sense of the word, I call Phusike, or
natural philosophy. The end of this is bare speculative truth: and
whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such, falls under this
branch, whether it be God himself, angels, spirits, bodies; or any of
their affections, as number, and figure, &c.
3. Practica. Secondly, Praktike, The skill of right applying our own
powers and actions, for the attainment of things good and useful. The
most considerable under this head is ethics, which is the seeking out
those rules and measures of human actions, which lead to happiness,
and the means to practise them. The end of this is not bare
speculation and the knowledge of truth; but right, and a conduct
suitable to it.
4. Semeiotike. Thirdly, the third branch may be called Semeiotike, or
the doctrine of signs; the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly
enough termed also Logike, logic: the business whereof is to consider
the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for the understanding of
things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For, since the things
the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the
understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or
representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and
these are ideas. And because the scene of ideas that makes one man's
thoughts cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, nor
laid up anywhere but in the memory, a no very sure repository:
therefore to communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as
record them for our own use, signs of our ideas are also necessary:
those which men have found most convenient, and therefore generally
make use of, are articulate sounds. The consideration, then, of ideas
and words as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable
part of their contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge
in the whole extent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly
weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of
logic and critic, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.
5. This is the first and most general division of the objects of our
understanding. This seems to me the first and most general, as well as
natural division of the objects of our understanding. For a man can
employ his thoughts about nothing, but either, the contemplation of
things themselves, for the discovery of truth; or about the things in
his own power, which are his own actions, for the attainment of his
own ends; or the signs the mind makes use of both in the one and the
other, and the right ordering of them, for its clearer information.
All which three, viz, things, as they are in themselves knowable;
actions as they depend on us, in order to happiness; and the right use
of signs in order to knowledge, being toto coelo different, they
seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual
world, wholly separate and distinct one from another.
THE END
-------------------
A dream of life in the "New World" [!!] for /the Scotch/, the English,
the "Irish", or the *Welsh* --
"From whence consequences flow" but /not so many, *not so many*/ ----
And finally a Gary Locke
With whom to "up"
/And like that./
-------------------
/John Locke/
Essay concerning *Human* Understanding
c. 1690
Chapter XXI
Of the Division of the Sciences
1. Science may be divided into three sorts. All that can fall within
the compass of human understanding, being either, First, the nature of
things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner
of operation: or, Secondly, that which man himself ought to do, as a
rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end,
especially happiness: or, Thirdly, the ways and means whereby the
knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and
communicated; I think science may be divided properly into these three
sorts:--
2. Physica. First, The knowledge of things, as they are in their own
proper beings, their constitution, properties, and operations; whereby
I mean not only matter and body, but spirits also, which have their
proper natures, constitutions, and operations, as well as bodies.
This, in a little more enlarged sense of the word, I call Phusike, or
natural philosophy. The end of this is bare speculative truth: and
whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such, falls under this
branch, whether it be God himself, angels, spirits, bodies; or any of
their affections, as number, and figure, &c.
3. Practica. Secondly, Praktike, The skill of right applying our own
powers and actions, for the attainment of things good and useful. The
most considerable under this head is ethics, which is the seeking out
those rules and measures of human actions, which lead to happiness,
and the means to practise them. The end of this is not bare
speculation and the knowledge of truth; but right, and a conduct
suitable to it.
4. Semeiotike. Thirdly, the third branch may be called Semeiotike, or
the doctrine of signs; the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly
enough termed also Logike, logic: the business whereof is to consider
the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for the understanding of
things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For, since the things
the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the
understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or
representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and
these are ideas. And because the scene of ideas that makes one man's
thoughts cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, nor
laid up anywhere but in the memory, a no very sure repository:
therefore to communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as
record them for our own use, signs of our ideas are also necessary:
those which men have found most convenient, and therefore generally
make use of, are articulate sounds. The consideration, then, of ideas
and words as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable
part of their contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge
in the whole extent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly
weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of
logic and critic, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.
5. This is the first and most general division of the objects of our
understanding. This seems to me the first and most general, as well as
natural division of the objects of our understanding. For a man can
employ his thoughts about nothing, but either, the contemplation of
things themselves, for the discovery of truth; or about the things in
his own power, which are his own actions, for the attainment of his
own ends; or the signs the mind makes use of both in the one and the
other, and the right ordering of them, for its clearer information.
All which three, viz, things, as they are in themselves knowable;
actions as they depend on us, in order to happiness; and the right use
of signs in order to knowledge, being toto coelo different, they
seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual
world, wholly separate and distinct one from another.
THE END
-------------------
A dream of life in the "New World" [!!] for /the Scotch/, the English,
the "Irish", or the *Welsh* --
"From whence consequences flow" but /not so many, *not so many*/ ----
And finally a Gary Locke
With whom to "up"
/And like that./
